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GIGI BERARDI*

Natural Resource Policy, Unforgiving
Geographies, and Persistent Poverty in
Alaska Native Villages
ABSTRACT
This paper presents an analysis regarding the causes of
persistent ruralpoverty in Alaska Native villages. It discusses the
background, structure, and function of PL 92-203, the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), how the Act undermines
Native polities and traditionalnaturalresourceutilization, and the
Act's consequent contribution to persistent rural village poverty.
The principal problem is seen to be difficulties and conflicts in
achieving sustainableand equitable economic development under
the corporate structure imposed by ANCSA, due to existing
constraintsof physical geography, biological resourcecharacteristics, and traditions of governance and resource use. The paper
augments earlierfindings of the Rural Sociological Society's Task
Force on Persistent Rural Poverty regarding the obstacles to
economic developmentfacing naturalresource-dependentcommunities in ruralAmerica, and the need to consider spatiallocation as a
criticalfactor in explainingruralpoverty.
INTRODUCTION
Despite decades of programs and policies designed to alleviate
rural poverty in the United States, poverty persists. In the past,
policymakers have focused on failures in the labor market as a cause of
rural poverty yet have failed to answer a fundamental question: why are the
same groups of people living in poverty decade after decade, generation
after generation?
As a member of the Rural Sociological Society (RSS) Task Force on
Persistent Rural Poverty, the author examined the relationship between
extractive natural resources, local communities, and poverty. 1 The present
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Research, University of Alaska, Anchorage; Steven McNabb, Social Research Institute; Carol

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

paper discusses policy implications specific to the case of Alaska in more
detail. In so doing, it augments the findings of the RSS Task Force regarding
the obstacles to economic development facing natural resource-dependent
communities in rural America, and the need to consider spatial location as
a critical factor in explaining rural poverty.
This paper presents an analysis regarding the causes of persistent
rural poverty in Alaska villages. It discusses the background, structure, and
function of PL 92-203, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA,"
or, "the Act"), how the Act undermines Native polities and traditional
natural resource utilization, and the Act's consequent contribution to
persistent rural village poverty. The principal problem is seen to be
difficulties and conflicts in achieving sustainable and equitable economic
development under the corporate structure imposed by ANCSA, due to the
existing constraints imposed by the physical geography, biological resource
characteristics, and traditions of governance and resource use. Approaches
to resolving continuing issues also are discussed.
UNDERSTANDING PERSISTENT POVERTY IN VILLAGE ALASKA
Previous studies have identified a number of critical concepts in
explaining persistent poverty in isolated communities in Alaska.2 These
include economic factors as well as constraints on natural resource use.
Identified factors include limited options for development, high cost of
living, economies dependent on single resources, and restrictions on
traditional natural resource use.

Lewis, School of Agriculture and Land Resources Management, University of Alaska,
Fairbanks; Jean Melious and Lynn Robbins, Western Washington University; and, James
Allaway, Resources International. Any errors or omissions are the author's responsibility.
1. See RURAL SOaOLOGICAL SocImY TASK FORCE ON PERsSEN RURAL POVERTY,
PERswrENrPOVERTY INRURAL AMERICA (1993). The task force was organized to outline new

directions in theory that would provide complementary and cumulative explanations of
persistent rural poverty. Its intent was to move beyond major existing theories such as the
culture of poverty and embrace more robust theories such as rational underinvestment,
dependency, moral exclusion, and global economic restructuring. The task force focused on
rural rather than urban poverty since previous research had centered mostly on urban areas.
Key terms-"persistent," "rural," and "poverty"-are defined and discussed on pp. 4-7 and
20-22 of the report. Briefly, "persistent" refers to the permanence of a substantial segment
of the population with incomes below the poverty threshold despite ameliorative efforts,
"rural" refers to nonmetropolitan or more sparsely populated areas, and families living in
"poverty" are those whose cash income is below the official poverty threshold. In the 1990
U.S. Bureau of the Census data, 48 thresholds are used to determine poverty status; these
are adjusted annually to reflect inflation.
2. Gigi Berardi, Native Alaskan Populations at Risk: Putting the Last First (1991)
(paper presented to the Rural Sociological Society Meeting (on file with author).
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Limited Optionsfor Economic Development. Populations at risk often
are situated in economically nonviable areas, which reduces their opportunities to escape poverty.3 This is particularly true of "Village Alaska," the
more than 50 percent of Alaskan villages that are home to over 50 percent
of the poverty population in Alaska and that have no significant marketable
natural resources. 4 Income transfers and related economic assistance have
heavily supported these villages and have been instrumental in maintaining
village residents in these economically nonviable locations.5 This public
sector support was particularly influential in the late 1970s and 1980s, a
period of large infusions of public monies for fixed capital improvements
and income assistance.6 During this period of strong state oil revenues,
funds were made available for basic public service capital improvements- e.g., schools and electric utilities-to bring village living standards
more in line with the rest of the state, and for income transfers to supplement scarce wage-earning opportunities.
High Costs of Living. Even though income in villages may be above
nominal poverty levels, living costs often are extreme, and resulting health
and safety problems may preempt people from living comfortably and
securely. A case in point is the village of Gambell on St. Lawrence Island,
where families often do not have enough money to buy fuel oil although the

3. See Lee Huskey, Regional Poverty, National Transfers: Transfer Programs and
Poverty in Rural Alaska (1990) (paper presented to the WEA International Conference, on
file with author); ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N/JOINT FEDERAL-STATE COMM'N ON POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS AFFECTING ALASKA NATIVES, ALASKA NATIVES COMMIsSION FINAL REIORT, VOL I-Ill
(1994) [hereinafter ALASKA NATIES COM'N]; MATTHEW BERmAN & KAREN P. FOSTER, INST. OF
Soc. AND ECON. REEARCK PovEmRY AMONG ALASKA NATiES, RESEARCH SUMMARY 31 (1986).
4. The term "Village Alaska" refers to remote villages, many of which are characterized
by their small size, with populations of less than 500, and at least one-quarter of the
households living below the poverty level; see LE HUSKEY, INST. OF Soc. AND ECON.
RESEARCH, THE ECONOMY OF VILLAGE ALASKA 2 (1992). These villages are found principally
in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta, southwest, and interior regions, as well as to a lesser extent
the northwest, arctic, and Alaska Peninsula regions. More prosperous villages are found in
areas where they receive direct income from oil or taxes on oil (as on the North Slope), fish
(as in some coastal regions), timber (as in southeast and southcentral Alaska), or minerals
(areas of the northwest region). Id. For more detailed information, see RURAL SOCIOLOGICAL
SOCIETY TASK FORCE ON PERSISTENT RURAL POVERTY, supra note 1, at 21; STATE OF ALASKA
DEPARTm
OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS, COMMUNITY INFORMATION SUMMAmES
or
(1995) [hereinafter SUMMARIES].
5. Income transfers and related support include money and services the federal and
state governments provide such as: welfare, pension, and other payment programs; jobs in
post offices and other public agencies; and schools and other services which also are
subsidized. In 1989, transfers accounted for nearly 60 percent of per capita personal income
in western coastal Alaska. See HUSKEY, supra note 4, at 9.
6. See HUSKEY, supranote 4, at 9-1Z GORDON S. HARRISON, THE YEARS OF BIG SPENDING
INALASKA: How GOOD ISTHE RECORD? (Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Research, Occasional Papers No.
20, 1989).
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median family income was approximately $16,000 in 1989.7 Transportation
costs alone double the price of goods and services, since virtually all
materials must be flown in. Many other villages are located on major rivers
or the sea coast and receive their year's supply of bulk fuel and other heavy
goods in one barge shipment each summer. If this delivery fails (due, for
example, to low river levels or shipping equipment breakdown), or if an
accident such as a fire destroys stockpiles, then even more costly emergency
air transport is necessary.
Single-ResourceDependent Economy. Poverty is especially persistent
in states dependent on a single natural resource industry! No other state
shows such a dramatic dependence on a single resource as Alaska.9 Eightyfive percent of Alaska State revenues are derived from one resource - oil - and about one of every three jobs in Alaska is supported by
state spending.10 Economic development in Alaska, including the availability of public sector funding for transfers, is closely tied to oil production and
markets. Increased oil prices from 1973 to 1982 led to a widespread
expectation that Alaska would always receive large revenues from oil, and
public sector programs and the overall economy expanded greatly. When
oil revenues dropped in the mid-1980s, cutbacks in public programs
inevitably followed and economic activity declined markedly."
Restricted Resource Use. The management of natural resources by
regulatory agencies restricts resource use by the most vulnerable groups 2

7.

See SUMMARIES, supra note 4.

&TERESA HULL, TRACKING THE STRUCrURE OF THE ALASKA
ECONOMY: THE 1994 ISER MAP ECONOMIC DATABASE (Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Research Working
Paper 94.1, 1994); MATrr-Ew BERMAN ET AL., INST. OF Soc. & ECON.RESEARCH, NATURAL
RESOURCE DEPwTON AND SOCIAL INCOMB ACCOuNTING: SUSTAINABLE INCOME IN PETROLEUMDEPENDENT ECONOMmS (1992).
9. U.S. BuREAuoFTHE CESSTATisncALABsrRACrOFTHEUNrrEDrSTATS 1990, 110n
EDITION (1990).
8. See 0. SCOTT GOLDSMITH

10. Before the Prudhoe Bay oil fields were discovered, Alaska was a state of modest
means. Military and other federal government spending and extractive industries (fishing,
mining, logging, and some oil production in Cook Inlet) provided most of state income. The
economic impact of the discovery of oil in Alaska was dramatically different than elsewhere,
primarily because the state government owned the field and thus could collect royalties as
well as taxes, large amounts of oil could be produced (close to two million barrels a day),
and soon after oil began flowing, the world price tripled. Thomas A. Morehouse, Alaska's
Political Economy: Myths and Realities 2 (1993) (paper presented to the Western Regional
Science Association Annual Meetings, Wailea, Maui, Hawaii) (on file with the Nat. Resources

J.).
11. Id.; see alsoBERMANETAL., supra note 8, at 13-19.
12. See ROBERT CHAMBERS, RURAL DEVELOPMENT: PUTTING THE LAST FIRST 131-38 (1983);
JOSEPH JORGENSEN, OIL AGE ESKIMOS 11-19 (1990).
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and localities, 13 contributing to their poverty. In Alaska this is manifested
particularly by the establishment of harvest rules and quotas for fish or
wildlife that can restrict subsistence harvests for village populations. 4 For
example, restrictions on harvest methods and seasons resulting from
management of fish populations primarily for commercial and sport fishing
industries has resulted in significant declines in the subsistence harvest by
local residents of steelhead (an anadromous fish species) and various
salmon species in the Situk River near Yakutat.'5
The understanding of rural poverty in Alaska is generally based on
the forgoing concepts. The important role that policy plays in maintaining
populations in economically nonviable areas is not as well examined. This
role is exemplified by ANCSA, a major land claims settlement and natural
resources policy that has had significant impacts on Alaska Native
livelihood, polities, and poverty.
ANCSA AS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY
ANCSA provided a federal land settlement extinguishing
aboriginal claims to the state's 152 million hectares of land and territorial
waters by providing Alaska Natives with 17.8 million hectares of land and
nearly one billion dollars. One of the most significant features of the law
was the establishment of village and regional corporations as owners of the
land and recipients of the money. The consequences of this corporate
structure have reverberated through Alaska Native communities and the
entire Alaskan economy and society in the years since.
Background to ANCSA
The United States occupied Alaska without, for the most part, the
wars and subsequent treaties that settled Native American land claims in
the Lower 48 states. Although Alaska Native land claims were asserted as
early as 1867 when the Tlingit Indians of southeast Alaska challenged the
sale of Alaska by Russia to the United States, decades passed with little
attention to and no resolution of these claims. Native groups intermittently

13. See William Freudenburg, Addictive Economies: Extractive Industries and
Vulnerable Localities in a Changing World Economy 9 (1991) (paper presented to the Rural
Sociological Society Annual Meeting, Columbus) (on file with the Nat. Resources 1.).
14. See JORGENSEN, supra note 12; for a related discussion of the political assault on
subsistence harvest preferences by organized urban interests, see ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N,
supra note 3, Vol. III, at 14-42.

15. See DAVID D. Mnus& ANNE S. FIRMAN, FISH AND WILDUFE USE INYAKurAT ALASKA:
CONTEMPORARY PATTERNS AND CHANGES 215-227 (Div.of Subsistence, Alaska Dep't of Fish
& Game, Technical Paper No. 131 (1986)).
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pressed the issue. In 1912, leaders of the Tanana chiefs in interior Alaska
asserted Native title to traditional hunting and fishing lands that were being
used by settlers. In 1935, the Tlingit, joined by the Haida, challenged the
withdrawal of lands for the Tongass National Forest.16
With statehood in 1959 and the provision that the state could take
title to 41.7 million hectares from the federal domain, tension mounted over
the effects of state ownership on traditional use by Natives and on their
aboriginal land title.' 7 Native leaders and supporters, and the new Alaska
Federation of Natives (AFN), pushed for a land settlement."8 The issue
continued unresolved and in 1966 Interior Secretary Stewart Udall froze the
conveyance of state-selected lands pending a Native land claims settlement.
Shortly thereafter the key incentive for concluding a land settlement
arose from the discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's North Slope in
1967. All sides realized a pipeline across Alaska to get the oil to market
might be delayed for years by aboriginal land claim challenges. In addition,
the state urgently wanted to continue to build its own land base. 9 The oil
was seen as enormously important to state development and national
interests, and the political will coalesced to settle Native land claims and
remove the obstacle."

16.

It was not until 1959 that the Tlingit and Haida received a judgment in the 1935

action. As reported by Berger, 'the U.S. Court of Claims explicitly declared that the Treaty
of Cession, 1867, did not extinguish aboriginal title." Seven years later the tribe was awarded
a cash settlement of 7.5 million dollars in compensation, with no return of Native lands. See
THOMASR. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW COMM'N 22
(1985). Berger was head of the Alaska Native Review Commission. The commission was
appointed by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, an organization of Eskimos from Alaska,
Canada, and Greenland, to review ANCSA.
17. See, e.g., ALASKA DEPT OF EDUC., THE ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETLEMENT ACT:
SELECTED STUDENT READINGS 6 (1986).

18. Id. at 7.
19. There was tremendous pressure on Native groups as well to settle land claims, given
the expected economic importance of the "super giant" Prudhoe Bay oil field. Its estimated
12 billion recoverable barrels of oil characterized it as an extremely rare geological find. See
Morehouse, supra note 10, at 5.
20. See the following for identification and discussion of issues, events, and participants
in the formulation of ANCSA. Morehouse, supra note 10; Victor Fisher, Alaska Native Land
Claims Bibliography (paper presented to the Seventh Libraries Colloquy, Centre d'Etude
Arctiques, Paris 1979); BERGIM, supra note 16; THOMAS A. MOREHOUSE, THE ALASKA NATIVE
CLAnMSrr'LmaNT AC, 1991, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 20-21 (Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Research
Occasional Paper No. 19, 1988) [hereinafter MOREHOUSE, ANCSA]; MARY C. BERRY, THE
ALASKA PIPINE, THE POLITICs OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND CLAM (1975); FREDERICK SEAGAYUK
BIGCIM & JAMES ITo-ADLER, LErrERsTO HOWARD: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ALASKA NATIVE
LAND CLAIMS (1974). See also DAN O'NMLL,THE FIRECRACKER BOYS (1994), for a description

of a Cold War-era attempt to use nuclear bombs to excavate a harbor in northwest Alaska,
which subsequently prompted the growth of Alaska Native leadership and activism on land
rights.
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ANCSA: Goals and Objectives
Although the immediate impetus for ANCSA was to allow North
Slope oil fields to be developed, framers of the Act set out to accomplish
much broader goals and objectives. For many proponents, a fundamental
purpose of ANCSA was to achieve far-reaching social policy objectives.'
ANCSA was explicitly designed to change the structure of the body politic

in Native communities, and thereby improve their economic situation. The
framing of ANCSA drew heavily on a report by the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska, which considered Alaska Natives
to be part of a culture of poverty. To change the economic situation, the
report held, one needed to change the culture. '
Previously, a largely traditional, consensus-based polity typically
existed, particularly at the village level. ' ANCSA mandated a for-profit
corporate structure foreign to most Native communities as the mechanism
for economic transformation. The intent of the corporate structure was to
assist Alaska Natives in their social and economic development24 by giving

21. Some saw the Act as social engineering. See STEWARTFRENCH, ARCnC INST. OF NORTH
AMERICA,ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SmLxmENT Acr 3,16 (1972):
...
while admittedly a compromise and far from perfect, [ANCSAJ
nevertheless marks a great moral and ethical advance over the white man's
dealings with the native inhabitants of the Lower 48. .. the Act will
provide an unparalleled case study on a large scale of the adaptability to
a radically changed economic, social, and political environment of several
markedly different ethnic groups, which have dealt effectively for centuries

with a harsh physical environment and a totally different level of social and
economic problems. The mechanism for the use, development, and control
over the lands, resources, and money by the Native people of Alaska-only
a few generations removed from aboriginal existence -is that relatively
modem business creation, the corporation. As shareholders, the Native
people are entitled to a voice in management and a share in the lands,
assets, and income ....
Id. at 3, 16.
Economic benefits anticipated included development of natural resources, capital
improvements (for example, housing, transportation, and services), employment
opportunities, and establishment of small business enterprises. Broader social benefits
included raised educational levels and greater Native political influence. Id. at 4-5.
22. See BERGER, supra note 16, at 45. As BERGER stated, "ANCSA is an attempt to recreate Main Street on the tundra." Id. at 45-46. ANCSA does this by promoting capital
expenditures. Rather than strengthening the existing subsistence economy, it encourages
extraction of natural resources and the anticipated economic development following.
23. See MOREHOUSE, ANCSA, supra note 20, at 1-2.
24. This is clear in some of the provisions of ANCSA. For example, the 70 percent
revenue sharing among corporations underscores the role that Congress saw for the
corporations, not merely to make profits but to provide a degree of equity among Alaska
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them control -as corporate shareholders-over their land and other natural
resources and the profit motive for economic development, while avoiding
the paternalism (and attendant continuing federal obligations) of the
reservation system in the contiguous 48 states.' Most framers of the Act,
both non-Native and Native, saw the corporation model as the key
instrument to help-and perhaps induce-Native groups to make the
transition to a modern economic society.
However widespread the desire for a settlement, many Alaska
Natives either had doubts about, or were not aware of, particular provisions
of the Act or their implications for achieving basic goals and objectives. At
minimum, the full impacts of choosing corporations as the implementing
mechanism for ANCSA policy could not have been widely understood, and
the corporation structure thus can not be seen as the carefully considered
choice by an informed populace for the favored form of resource management.

Natives. ELY, GUESS & RUDD, RURAL ALASKA COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM, SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS OF THE ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEM E ACT 151-53 (1972) [hereinafter ELY].

25. Before 1968 there was no mention of corporations; the first bills introduced in 1967
resolved claims through "tribes, bands, villages, communities, associations or other
identifiable groups of Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts," ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATVE

LAND CLAIMS, 153 (1978). In 1968, in U.S. Senate Interior Committee meetings, business
corporations were proposed as the means of carrying out the settlement, in large part due
to opposition to the power of the federal government, as shown through the BIA's
bureaucratic and inept handling of its responsibilities on reservations. Senator Henry
Jackson, one of the main architects of ANCSA, and other major figures in Congress rejected
tribal governments as the 'vehicle" for implementing ANCSA. ANCSA, in terms of policy,
specifically avoided the creation of "permanently racially defined institutions," namely,
tribal institutions. This was a departure from the prior practice of creating reservations and
the special obligation of the federal government to provide health and social services to other
Native Americans. Opposition to extending the Indian reservation system to Alaska was
widespread. Even AFN attorney, Barry Jackson, urged the corporation structure as the main
implementation vehicle. The theme of the 1971 AFN convention, the last held before the
passage of ANCSA, was, "In the white man's society, we need white man's tools." Id.
26. There is no doubt that the enactment of ANCSA, although now celebrated as a
holiday in certain Native organizations such as the AFN, was a bittersweet victory. An
editorial in the TundraTimes at the time stated:
962 million [dollars] - a payment for lands lost. These are almost
astronomical figures, but at the end of the voting, they were met with
almost a dead silence by some 600 native delegates to the AFN convention
.... The delegates must have sensed that as they voted, they were also
voting to relinquish some 300 million acres of land forever- lands they and
their ancestors were accustomed to using .... 'For several times today, I
didn't know whether to laugh or cry,' said a woman delegate .... The
atmosphere at the convention hall seemed to be prefaced with a special
kind of sadness-a strange ending to a great fight for justice." See Howard
Rock, Congress PassesAlaska Native Land Claims Bill: 'I Didn't Know Whether
To Laugh Or Cry,' in ALASWA NATIVE CLAIMS SurTLEMENT ACT: A SCRAPBOOK
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Provisions of ANCSA

The key provisions of ANCSA concerned land and money, and the
control of those resources. Most fundamentally, Alaska Natives received
17.8 million of the state's 152 million hectares and nearly one billion dollars
for their aboriginal land claims. These assets were divided among nearly
200 village corporations and 12 regional corporations, with each village
becoming part of one of the regions.2' Village corporations received surface

title to 11.3 million hectares, and the regional corporations received the
subsurface title to village lands and full title to an additional 6.5 million
hectares. 28
The for-profit corporation was superimposed on pre-existing
village governmental structures, which were allowed to continue. For

example, federally recognized IRA (Indian Reorganization Act of 1934)
governments and traditional Native council governments in Alaska
continued in a trust relationship with the federal government.
In addition to settling Alaska Native land and resource ownership
claims, ANCSA extinguished Native claims to any other traditional landrelated rights including aboriginal hunting and fishing rights. A variety of
provisions set policy on other related aspects of resource ownership and
utilization.29

HIsrORy 61 (1991). In particular, most Natives were not familiar with
corporations as a form of organization, nor with the kinds of laws usually
governing it. Compounding problems, many villagers, particularly older
persons in northern and western Alaska, could not understand the
language or meaning of provisions of the Act.
See BERGER, supranote 16.
27. An authorized Thirteenth Regional Corporation, for Natives residing outside of
Alaska, formed in 1976 after contested elections and lawsuits.
28. The twelve regional corporations, organized soon after ANCSA was passed, actually
began to function in 1975. A total of about 75,000 shareholders eventually enrolled in groups
ranging from 1,100 (Ahtna Corporation) to about 16,000 (Sealaska Corporation). Regional
corporations received 440 million dollars out of the 962.5 million dollar cash settlement;
village corporations and individuals received the rest. STEvEN COLT, INsT. OF Soc. & ECON.
RESEARCH, FINANCIAL PERFoRmANcE OF NATIVE REIONAL CORPORATIONS 2,6,8,21 (1991).
29. Some of the most pertinent provisions of ANCSA include the following: U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ANCSA 1985 STUDY (1984); Fisher, supra note 20; ELY supra
note 24.
Section 2 specifies the goals and intents of Congress: to settle land claims without litigation,
with maximum participation by Natives in decisions, without establishing permanent
racially defined institutions and at the same time without diminishing obligations of the
United States or Alaska to protect and promote the rights and welfare of Natives. ALASKA
DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 17, at 30-33.
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Changes to ANCSA
Although more than 50 amendments have made numerous changes
to provisions of the Act," up to the present the structure of ANCSA,
including the corporation model, has remained largely intact. 1 The change
in law with arguably the most importance for Native resource use resulted
from the passage in December 1980 of the separate Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA"), PL 96-487. ANILCA addressed a
resource issue of great importance to Alaska Natives that was omitted from

Section 4 extinguishes Natives' claims to any traditional land rights beyond that given in the
settlement.
Section 5 contains provisions for enrollment of Natives, including the controversial provision
that "New Natives,' born after December 18, 1971, are not eligible to receive corporation
stock. As early as 1991, over half of Alaska Natives were not shareholders. Section 7 provides
for the creation of regional corporations and Section 8 for the creation of village corporations,
with eligible Natives each holding 100 shares. No stock could be sold, pledged, seized for
debt, or otherwise alienated (with a few exceptions, such as to pay child support). At the end
of 20 years all this stock was to be canceled and unrestricted stock issued in exchange.
Section 9 provides that 70 percent of net revenues from the sale by regional corporations of
natural resources conveyed as part of the settlement must be shared among all regional
corporations in proportion to the enrolled population of each.
30. Perceived legal, political, and economic problems with ANCSA resulted in strong
demands, led by the AFN and Native leaders, for changes to the law, especially before the
1991 deadline when protection of stock from alienation and lands from taxation was to
expire. See Thomas A. Morehouse, in Native Claims and PoliticalDevelopment 21-22, WESTERN
REGIONAL SCIENCE AsOCXATION ANNUAL MEETING (1987) (paper on file with the author and

the Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Research, Anchorage, Alaska).
31. For example, in 1976, amendments extended the deadline for enrollment of Natives
and contained provisions for the mergers of Native corporations, timelines for the
submission of reports of the Joint Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission, and land
exchanges. Amendments passed in 1987 made significant changes to provisions of the
original law that were to go into effect in 1991 (causing it to be referred to as the "1991 law
or 1991 amendments"). The amendments passed in 1987 extend indefinitely the restrictions
on stock alienation, unless corporate shareholders remove the restrictions by majority vote.
The amendments also extend the tax exemptions and other protection on all ANCSA lands
that remain undeveloped, unleased, and unsold. In general terms, land cannot be taxed;
taken by trespassers who otherwise might acquire rights to the land (through trespassers'
or squatters' rights); taken by creditors to pay a debt owed by the corporation; or lost if the
corporation files bankruptcy or is involuntarily dissolved. In addition, the amendments call
for the issuance of additional stock to "new Natives" (those born after the enactment of
ANCSA in 1971), elders, and others who missed the previous official enrollments of eligible
shareholders in the ANCSA corporations. Protection of subsistence hunting and fishing
opportunities was one of the most important motivations for these amendments. The
amendments help keep Native corporations and lands under Native control, but they may
also diminish the value of corporate stock by restricting its sale and providing for the issuing
of additional shares. See ALASKA FEDERATION OF NATIvES, 1991: MAKING IT WORK 3, 14, 37

(1988).
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ANCSA-protection of subsistence uses-by mandating a hunting and
fishing preference for rural residents in Alaska.' ANILCA's main function
was to add 42 million hectares to Federal conservation systems in Alaska
and to establish almost 23 million hectares of Federal wilderness.
Perspectives on ANCSA
Assessments of how well ANCSA satisfied its basic objective- to
justly settle Native land claims -varied among observers. To most framers
of ANCSA, and probably much of the general public, the monetary and
land entitlement terms of the settlement seemed at least fair.1 It is not
difficult to see why the settlement was considered generous, particularly in
comparison with treatment of Native Americans in the contiguous 48 states.
Alaska Natives were to obtain fee simple title to more land than was held
in trust for all other Native Americans combined. Compensation for
relinquished lands was nearly four times the amount all Indian tribes had
won in the 25-year lifetime of the Indian Claims Commission.'
Viewed in other ways, the settlement terms appear less bountiful.
The $962.5 million cash settlement was an arbitrary amount, a blend of what
the United States House and Senate in compromise with each other felt the
country could afford to pay and what would be sufficient for the viability
of Native corporations. It was not based on any lengthy review of the
current or potential economic value of the land.a
From the Alaska Native perspective, much was given up. In 1971,
Alaska Natives held aboriginal title to most of the land in Alaska-about
eight and one-half times the amount of land they received in the settlement.
32. See Monica E. Thomas, Conflict and Controversy: Land Ownership In Alaska, 5 LAND
USE POL. i21, at 126 (1988).
33. As a former Chief Counsel of the U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs observed, "the Act is the most generous settlement ever granted by a government to
a relatively powerless minority." See FRENcH, supranote 21, at 16.
34. See ARNOLD, supra note 25, at 147-48. This perception in turn affected attitudes
toward Alaska Natives in following years. As Berger noted:
There can be no doubt that the amount of ANCSA's cash compensation
caught the public's eye. Millie Buck, speaking at Gulkana, remarked that
constant reiteration of the generosity of the settlement had left White
people with the idea that an Indian who was driving a new car had not
worked for it but had simply bought it from a share of the settlement....
Lena Dewey, at Nenana, said, 'You have a lot of the White community
against anything that's Native because of the land claims, because they
thought we got so much.'
See BERGER, supra note 16, at 27-28. A change in public opinion about the generosity of the
Act likely would require the public becoming better informed about the settlement terms
and the overall consequences and beneficiaries.
35. See ALASKA DEP'T OF EDUC., supranote 17, at 32.
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The cash settlement was equivalent to a little less than three dollars per acre
(or seven dollars per hectare) relinquished.' The settlement also appears
more modest when compared with recent forms of State of Alaska
assistance financed by oil revenues from state lands. For example, electricity
consumers served by the Four Dam Pool hydroelectricity projects in Alaska
have benefited from $485 million in state grants and loans, equivalent to
about $16,000 per beneficiary. 3'
In addition, although ANCSA policy was directed toward Native
peoples, its economic impacts were far broader. It can be argued that major
beneficiaries of ANCSA included the rest of Alaska's population and its
commercial and political sectors: organized sports people, state government, the oil industry, and others.'
CORPORATE STRATEGIES, VILLAGE ENVIRONMENTS, AND
TRADITIONAL VALUES
The implications of ANCSA policy-particularly its creation of
village corporations- are far-reaching in Village Alaska. Constraints of both
physical and cultural geographies hamper efforts to adapt ANCSA policies
to Alaska Native goals. ANCSA's separation of land ownership from
communal governance has affected management motivation and produced
conflicts with traditional subsistence uses.
Alaska's Unforgiving Geographies
Overlooked in much of the enthusiasm for the corporate model
introduced by ANCSA were the realities of Alaska's geographies. Both the
physical and cultural geographies of Village Alaska severely restrict the
sustainable economic development intended to result from vesting profitdriven corporations with village land resources and bankrolling their
startup.
Physical Geography
The physical geography of much of Village Alaska does not easily
accommodate entrepreneurial ventures that require external markets.
Villages generally lack arable land as well as the fuel and non-fuel resources
needed for capital-intensive extractive industries. Labor is unskilled, and

36.

See BERGER, supranote 16, at 24, 27.

37. See Steve Colt, ANCSA and Rural Alaska. An Economic Reality Check (1993) (paper
presented to Commonwealth North, Anchorage) (on file with author).
38.

See MORmOUSE, ANCSA, supra note 30, at 20-21.
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the costs of energy, transportation, and communication are high. Ironically,
little investment opportunity exists for the substantial sums of money
provided by ANCSA. The policy objective of economic development
through corporate activity thus stood little chance of succeeding in many
villages.
Probably the most important lesson learned from ANCSA's limited
economic impact is that there is scant hope for a self-sustaining mixed
economy in much of Village Alaska. Many villages represent sites formerly
used part of the year in a mobile subsistence economy.39 In short, locations
ideally suited for subsistence activities are ill suited to the non-Native cash
economy. Lands selected by the village corporations were chosen mainly for
subsistence rather than for their opportunities for economic
development.
4
Most of the land selected had no commercial possibilities. 0
Yet village residents need the "omnipresent, nonnegotiable
elements of contemporary village life" such as "heating oil, electricity,
cotton, wool and fiber-filled clothing, coffee, sugar, televisions and other
accoutrements of the American mass culture" that are difficult to obtain in
Village Alaska.41 It is the public sector that supports the purchase of many
of these items and the delivery of these services. Moreover, the per capita
cost to the public sector of providing a minimum level of service is high in
remote regions. For example, one school principal may be needed whether
the school has 20 or 200 students. 2 Extreme physical conditions such as
harsh climates also add to the cost of service delivery and transportation.
Furthermore, the transfer economy is already proving to be
unsustainable. As state oil revenues decline, state and local government
expenditures are cut back, direct transfer programs are reduced, and capital
projects providing needed cash income for families are eliminated.43 The
transfer economy also encourages return migration, increasing the level of
population in a region beyond its economic viability." Transfers then may

39. See Gigi Berardi, Rural Sanitation and Participatory Research in Alaska (1997) (paper
presented to the Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting, Fort Worth) (on file
with author).
40.

See BERGER, supra note 16, at 34.

41. See ALASKA FEDERATION OF NATIVES (AFN), THE AFN REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
ALASKA NATIVES: A CALL FOR ACTION 36 (1989).
42. See Gunnar Knapp & Lee Huskey, Effects of Transfers on Remote Regional Economies:
The Transfer Economy in Rural Alaska, GROWTH AND CHANGE 25-39 (Spring 1988). Huskey
estimates that village residents in the Norton Sound, Interior River, and Lower Kuskokwim
areas would have had to pay over 20 percent of their average per capita income in 1989 for
the same level of local government, school, and electric power services if these costs had not
been subsidized. See HUSKEY, supranote 4, at 11.
43. For more discussion of fiscal problems at the state level and their effects on the
village transfer economy, see BERMAN ET AL., supra note 8.
44. See HuSKE, supra note 5, at 9.
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provide the main financial base for people to live in a region without
sufficient viable economic activity.
Cultural Geography
The cultural geography of much of Village Alaska does not easily
accommodate business ventures for private gain. Subsistence activities
remain an integral part of Alaska Native culture.* In general, there is no
well-developed market system (there are few middlepersons). Typically,
labor is given as an obligation of life; it is not a commodity that is bought
and sold in a village marketplace.
Further, most resources are used almost exclusively for local
consumption in much of Village Alaska, and usually every effort is made
to manage renewable resources for continued future use. In villages, the
organization of distribution, patterns of consumption, and ideology of
kinship and friendship obligations have changed little: Native subsistence
is neither nuclear nor private, in that sharing is critical to cultural identity
and survival.* The corporate obligation to provide financial return to
shareholders can run counter to these important subsistence uses of
resources, particularly fish, game, and their habitats, as discussed below.
Moreover, the values and processes of prevailing systems of governance
and decision-making in villages were quite different from the corporations
that now managed the communities' land and other resources, particularly
forests.
Impacts on Subsistence
Subsistence is an important element of family economies and a
central part of personal and cultural identity for Village Alaska Native
residents. Alaska Natives rely on subsistence activities (often understood
as managing and harvesting food or other natural resource products
necessary for survival from the environment) for a significant part of their
livelihood in rural areas.47 Data collected through the 1980s for more than

45.
46.

See ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N, supranote 3, Vol. III.
For example, studies in the village of Yakutat on the Gulf of Alaska coast illustrate

the importance of sharing subsistence resources in Native and rural communities. In 1984,
moose were harvested by 22 percent but used by 70 percent of households, dungeness crab
was harvested by 40 percent but used by 98 percent of households, and shrimp were
harvested by 18 percent but used by 86 percent of households. See MILLS & FIRMAN, supra
note 15, at 89.
47. See BERGER, supra note 16; JOSEPH JORGENSEN, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE,
SOCIAL INDICATORS STUDY OF ALASKAN COASTAL VILLAGES, PART IV (1993); KEVIN WARING
ASSOCIATES, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, HOPE BASIN SOCOECONOMIC BASELNE STUDY,
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100 Alaska communities show that the per capita median harvest of
subsistence foods was 250 pounds, ranging from a low of 10 pounds per
person in Anchorage to a high of 1,498 pounds in the rural village of
Hughes.' In half of the sampled communities, wild food harvests were
greater than the United States yearly average of 222 pounds per person of
store-bought meat, fish, and poultry. Harvests in northwest and arctic
Alaska were the highest, averaging 610 pounds per capita.49
Subsistence has important cultural as well as nutritional values due
to spiritual linkages to some subsistence activities, the narrow distinction
between work and leisure (subsistence harvest work is often pleasurable),'
and the scarcity of steady wage employment. For much of Village Alaska,
subsistence is more than survival, it is a way of life.'1 Physical and cultural
geographies intermingle in the subsistence economy. For example, the
availability of subsistence resources explains in part the size and location of
villages.5 2 Small, isolated communities reduce the competition for subsistence resources.
In some ways, ANCSA has helped to financially support subsistence activities. Individual Alaska Natives often have used the funds from
settlement and income transfer programs for equipment, travel, and other
expenses related to subsistence. Estimates shov;r that over one-third of
household income may be devoted to subsistence food harvesting.' These
sources of funds also support the adaptation of technology in subsistence.
In recent decades, modem mechanized tools to assist hunting and fishing
and improve safety-e.g., snowmobiles, outboard motors, all-terrain
vehicles, rifles, fishing boats, chain saws, emergency radios - have become
widespread in Village Alaska. Thus, Natives retain subsistence life styles
yet mechanize harvest activities, in part with ANCSA disbursements and
state and federal subsidies.4 To the extent that such income helps achieve

VOL. 1-3, (1992); STEPHEN BRAUND &ASSOCIATES, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, NORTH
SLOPE SUBSISTENCE STUDY: BARROW 1988 (1989); STEPHEN BRAUND & ASSOCIATES, MINERALS
MANAGEMENT SERVICE, NORTH SLOPE SUBSISTENCE STUDY: WAINWRIGHT 1988 (1989); PETER
G. CRAIG, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, SUBSIsTENCE FImS aIS AT COASTAL VILLAGES IN
THE ALASKAN ARCTIC (1987).
48. Alaskans' Per CapitaHarvests of Wid Food, 21 ALASKAFISH &GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989,

at 14-15.
49. Id.
50. JORGENSEN, supra note 12, at 78.
51.

See BERGER, supra note 16, at 48-55, 67-68.

52. HUSKEY, supra note 4, at 13-14.
53. See JORGENSEN, supranote 12, in particular at 110, 179,182.
54.

As one village leader explained:
We take whatever technology works and shape it to our own purposes and
uses .... Apparently that bothers people who want us to remain pristine,
or to admit our contradictions of wanting technology and controlling and
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the goal of greater harvests, villagers will continue to be dependent on
them.5
Although this use of transfer funds demonstrates the persistence
and primacy of subsistence as a Native cultural value, it also reveals
another weakness in the corporate model for developing Village Alaska.
Individuals often use increased income to support subsistence rather than
enable their entry into the market economy as independent entrepreneurs,
as ANCSA intended.
The principal impact of ANCSA on subsistence is to transfer control
over many subsistence resources from communal governance to new
owners mandated to be motivated by succeeding in a market economy.
Non-market subsistence values-both economic and cultural-cannot
compete on corporate balance sheets with the market value of timber, oil,
gravel, waterfront recreational property, and other assets.
At the time ANCSA was formulated, some foresaw that it could
lead to conflicts between Native corporate land development and subsistence uses by corporation shareholders." In fact, significant conflicts have
occurred in several areas, most notably over timber cutting by village or
regional corporations (which is seen by some shareholders as damaging
wildlife and fish habitat as well as other culturally important resources).'
The corporate role in promoting oil development, particularly on lands such
as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge that are not owned by Native
corporations but provide habitat for wildlife resources, also has been
controversial with some groups."'

preserving the natural resources for our own use .... Why not? We've
always accepted and reshaped technology that works for our own
purposes.
JORGENSEN, supra note 12, at 69.

55. Government restrictions on the uses of many subsistence resources since 1971 have
led to conflicts over the harvesting of resources. One of the most disputed issues is the
regulation of hunting and fishing, in many cases pitting Natives against urban residents who
sport hunt and fish, and against management bodies, in particular, the Alaska Department
of Fish and Game and the policy-making Alaska Boards of Fisheries and Game.
56. See ARNOLD, supra note 25, at 293.
57. See ARNOLD, supranote 25, at 263-264. For example, Arnold reports that there was
awareness of the potential for conflict with essential subsistence uses from developments
such as timber cutting, oil drilling and production, or building tourist facilities.
58. See Tim Bristol, GainingInfluence, (Fall) NATIVE AMERICAS 14-21 (1996). Bristol
gives an overview of Native corporation economic development and resulting tensions. See
also Dirk Miller, DisappearingForest:Hoonah and ChichagofIsland Loggedfor Quick Cash, THE
JUNEAU EMPIRE, July 9,1995, at Al.
59. See BERGER, supra note 16, at 40-41. See also Bristol, supra note 58, at 21.
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Changing Native Polities
At the time ANCSA was enacted, as discussed earlier, it was
believed that the corporate structure being offered was an improvement on
the trust relationship maintained between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
the Native American Tribes of the contiguous 48 states. Certainly, it
seemed, social as well as financial goals could be accommodated within the
structure.
However, the local governing bodies allowed by the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 were structured more along the lines of a
traditional consensus-based polity. In establishing Native corporate
structures, ANCSA effectively separated Native political rights from the
ownership and control of land. The federally recognized and supported
political organization no longer administered the land.
The significant departure of ANCSA from other Native American
policy was that no federally protected land reservation system was set up,
nor lengthy wardship or trusteeship. Instead, modem corporations with
essentially fee-title to the land were quickly established. ANCSA abruptly
moved Alaska Natives into the mainstream of American capitalism as
corporate owners focused on financial performance rather than land
stewardship, with little regard to existing organizational structures or
behaviors
and lifestyles foreign to capital accumulation, and with little
6
success.

0

This sudden change did, however, parallel other more evolutionary
changes originating within Native societies themselves. These included the
emergence of a statewide organization (AFN) with increasingly centralized
decision-making (in contrast to traditional local or regional consensus), and
the emergence of statewide Native leaders with more experience in
institutions of the dominant "Anglo" culture and advanced formal
education. These developments were in response to state and national
pressures, often centered on the land claims issue, and may be seen as
continuing attempts by Alaska Natives to cope with the conflicts and
contradictions of a changing world in responsible and effective ways. The
tension inherent in changing from traditional social and political processes
is demonstrated by unease exhibited by some about the centralized
decision-making of the AFN while ANCSA was being prepared, and

60. As stated by a prominent Native corporate leader:
The irony strikes me that in the 'Lower 48,' Indian reservations exist with
the land largely protected, but in many instances with little economic
enterprise. For Alaska Natives, the land is totally at risk and economic
enterprises now account for most Native organization and activity.
See ALASKA DEP'TOF EDUC., supranote 17, at 23. See also Colt, supra note 37, for a discussion
of corporate economic success.
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disquiet expressed in recent years by Natives who feel those decisions did
not reflect their own views. 61 These tensions were part of what has led to the
efforts to change ANCSA, particularly concerning sovereignty and
subsistence.' 2
Employment as a Cultural Goal
One economic development impact of many ANCSA corporations
is increased shareholder employment.'3 Typically, jobs are scarce in Village
Alaska. Non-Natives often fill federal or state government positions -teachers, postal workers, law enforcement. Usually a few service
sector businesses such as restaurants, general stores, or transportation
providers operate in a village. Otherwise, very little employment exists
other than the jobs the corporations can generate. Understandably, job
creation is a primary goal of many corporations."
At least one ANCSA provision indirectly promotes employment
within some regions, albeit at the expense of other regions. The ANCSA
Section 9 requirement that 70 percent of net revenues from the sale of
natural resources conveyed as part of the settlement be shared among all
regional corporations acts as an incentive to increase local employment or
pay supranormal wages as a way of keeping revenues within the region. By
means of such practices, some ANCSA corporations have been able to help
finance the maintenance of cultural values in their own regions despite
structures foreign to traditional Native social and political organizations.
Apart from economic development goals, many corporations view
employing their shareholders as a way to promote cultural survival. For
example, three of the regional corporations-NANA [Northwest Alaska
Native Association), Ahtna, and Sealaska-stress the ability of their
shareholders to keep their cultural identity and subsistence lifestyle while
participating in the wage economy on their own terms as Native corporation employees. Shareholder employment thus can represent a limited
success both as a form of economic impact from ANCSA corporations, and
as an adaptation of ANCSA to support Alaska Native cultural values.

61. See BERGER, supra note 16.
62. Id. at 155-172.
63. See COLT, supra note 28, at 20.
64. For example, see ARNOLD, supra note 25, at 282, for the goals of the regional Calista
corporation.
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UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Two main, interconnected issues related to ANCSA remain
unresolved in the view of many Alaska Native leaders: protection of
subsistence opportunities and sovereignty.6 Both are aspects of the general
issue of who has control of land and resources. The present shape of these
issues and their persistence is due in large part to the mechanism ANCSA
employed-creating corporations and vesting them with ownership of
Native lands-to implement its economic development and social
transformation policies.
Subsistence
In making no provisions for Native subsistence rightse ANCSA set
the stage for continuing legal challenges over the last two and one-half
decades for Alaska Natives to regain some control over subsistence
resources. Current legal struggles over subsistence rights derive partly from
incompatible policy directives at the federal and the state levels subsequent
to ANCSA. ANILCA reserves subsistence hunting and fishing rights on
federal lands for rural residents, while state law giving a rural preference
has been found to be impermissible under the Alaska Constitution.6' This
discrepancy between federal and state law has forced the federal government to reassert management authority over fish and wildlife on federal
lands. The only resolution appears to be ". . refinements to state or federal
statutes." ' However, it remains uncertain whether Alaska Natives would
see adherence to a rural preference consistent with ANILCA as resolving
the fundamental issue of protecting subsistence. To many, neither federal
nor state management of their subsistence resources is the solution.

65. For example, Nelson N. Angapak, Sr., the AFN's Special Assistant for Land,
Anchorage, Angapak states, "the two major changes needed to ANCSA are to delete the
section on repealing aboriginal hunting and fishing rights and rewrite a section on Native
self-governance.' Interview with Nelson N. Angapak, Sr., AFN Special Asst. for Land, in
Anchorage, Alaska (August 21,1996).
66. See ALASKA DEP'T OF EDUc., supra note 17, at 37.
67. See the discussion on federal and state subsistence policies, and in particular,
subsistence statutes and The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, in ALASKA
NATIVES CoMISSoN, supra note 3, Vol. Il, at 12-39. For an overview of issues concerning
state management, see Alaska Department of Fish and Game Division of Subsistence,
Subsistence Management in Alaska: 1991 Update (1991); Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game, A
BrieffHistory: Why Alaska Has a Subsistence Law, 21 ALASKA FISH &GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at
11 [hereinafter Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game).
68. Id. Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game.
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Sovereignty
Instead, actions are underway in a number of Alaska Native
villages to assert and obtain federal recognition for tribal sovereignty as a
way to, among other purposes, regain local management of resources,
particularly fish and wildlife.' Recognition of tribes as sovereign governments, with natural resource management authorities, is considered by
some the only way to ensure that tribal interests in subsistence resources are
protected from the potentially conflicting interests both of ANCSA
corporations and of other entities: state government, local governments,
sports fishing or hunting groups, other resource development businesses,
and so on.
Tribal leaders hoped that the ANCSA amendments passed in 1987
would result in Congress recognizing the IRA and traditional Native
councils, thereby honoring claims of inherent, self-governing power based
on the existence of independent "nations" or organized tribes before the
"discovery" of the New World by Europeans." The councils would then
assume ownership and control of ANCSA lands and resources from the
corporations. Despite the efforts of groups such as the Alaska Native
Coalition fighting for political sovereignty, the corporate structures as
established by ANCSA remained. 71 Nevertheless, federally recognized IRA
governments continue to exist and at least 90 traditional Native council
governments72in Alaska maintain a trust relationship with the federal
government.

69. See ALASKA NATIVES COMMISSION, supra note 3, Vol. Il1,at 45-91; see also David
Hulen, Court Ruling UpholdsAuthority of Tribes, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 21,1996, at
Al, col. 1. The most significant recent action was the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in November 1996 affirming that ANCSA did not undermine at least some tribal
government powers to tax and govern land, including Native corporation lands. The court
also affirmed for the first time the existence in Alaska of 'Indian Country," a legal
classification that applies to reservations of self-governing tribes in the Lower 48 states.
Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Govt., 101 F.3d
1286 (9th Cir. 1996). Sovereignty advocates saw the decision as opening the way toward
tribal government land and resource management authority. See Carey Goldberg, Tiny Tribe
in Remote Arctic Is Jolting Alaska, N. Y.TIMES, May 9, 1997, at Al. However, the State of
Alaska successfully appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed the
Ninth Circuit. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Govt., 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
70. See MOREHOUSE, ANSCA, supra note 20, at 4.
71. Id. at 2. Morehouse discusses the unsuccessful attempt by leaders of the Native tribal
government movement in Alaska to use the 1991 amendments to establish governments
representing the values and interests of the minority Native culture. Congress chose not to
act on the political claims of Alaska Natives, declaring that no provision of the 1991 ANCSA
amendments would confer any sovereign governmental authority over lands (including
management of fish and wildlife resources) or persons in Alaska to Native organizations.
72. See also ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N, VOL. III, supra note 3, at 66.
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Land retention is the key issue to many Alaska Natives." Commonly suggested alternatives for resolving the issue involve restructuring
the ANCSA settlement to transfer corporation lands to other institutions,
either non-profit corporations, cooperatives, or tribal governments - all of
which are membership organizations that derive income from their assets
and provide members with benefits. Berger, for example, identifies and
endorses tribal government ownership as the favored solution among the
three options, based on his hearings in the villages.
Apart from land, the sovereignty issue also includes concern about
the potential loss of tribal or Native identity with all its cultural and
pragmatic implications. This concern arises from ANCSA's departure from
other settlements that treated Native Americans as wards of the federal
government. Although this difference is commonly seen as a major strength
of ANCSA relative to other settlements, some Alaska Natives voiced
another perspective as early as 1973: "If [Congress] had a magic wand, they
would probably do away with treaties, reservations, wardship, trusteeship,
and maybe even Indian tribes in general ... this process used to be called
termination,but now they sometimes call it self-determination."7
The issue was partly that social service programs might be phased
out "now that Natives are such wealthy citizens."' More basic, however,
was the concern over the ending of the historic relationship between Alaska
Natives and the federal government.7 6 Taken to an extreme, such a
settlement could terminate the federal-Native trust relationship, governmental social services, and further the assimilation of Natives into the
dominant society.7
Sovereignty is seen by many as the best corrective measure to the
social engineering of ANCSA. The Act extinguishes tribal title and rights to
land and resources and opens the way to resource development and
extraction, thereby encouraging the movement of Natives into a social and
economic mainstream.78 In contrast, recognition of aboriginal political
organization and relationships to the land could return control of the
direction and pace of development to the communities. By making these
fundamental changes in Alaska Native natural resource ownership and
control, sovereignty might provide a management structure more compatible with traditional Native polities and more amenable to Native commu-

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See BEIGER, supra note 16, at 113-116.
See BIGjM & ITO-ADLER, supra note 20, at 91.
Id.
See ARNOLD, supranote 25, at 275.
See Morehouse, supranote 30.

78.

Id.
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nity efforts to protect subsistence while providing for compatible economic
development.
CONCLUSIONS: ANCSA POLICY AND POVERTY
ANCSA demonstrates the risks in formulating policy that does not
reflect the cultural values of target populations and their natural resource
utilization strategies. Framers of ANCSA, including many Native leaders,
assumed -or at least hoped- villages would prosper with the creation of
corporations. For the most part, however, the for-profit corporations have
not been financially successful.", so Local employment has been only token
in some communities, and many villages have continued to grow, with
people remaining or returning to participate in the ANCSA disbursements
and public income transfers.' The villages are now more dependent than

79. For example, since 1976, with an initial cash capitalization of $458 million, the
regional corporations have produced aggregate shareholder wealth of $874 million
(compounded to 1988 dollars), equaling 85 percent of the $1,033 million that could have been
generated by a financial trust invested at a nominal average risk-free rate of seven percent.
If the figures are adjusted down for the high performance of one corporation and for the
effects of a series of questionable federal tax subsidies, wealth measured in 1988 is about 24
percent of the trust fund alternative. See COLT, supranote 63, at 1; see also ALASKA DEP'T OF
EDUC., supra note 17, at 21. Although Colt argues that the corporations would have been
better off financially if they had taken the cash settlement and invested in mutual funds,
others see the benefits that the corporations have brought. NANA Regional Corporation, for
example, employs more than a fifth of its 5,000 shareholders in mining, the oil industry, and
tourism. See COLT, supra note 63; Alaska: From Fur-tradingto Portfolios, THE ECONOMIST, May
25,1996, at 31.
80. The corporations have engaged in a variety of business activities, mostly direct
investments in Alaska. Some were novel. CIRI (the regional corporation for the Cook Inlet
area) secured the right to acquire surplus federal property in lieu of some of its land
entitlement-$500 in property for every acre of entitlement relinquished, putting $120
million into CIRI's capital endowment. This is about three times the amount of cash
originally conveyed to the corporation. Also, for several years the regional corporations had
the right to sell net operating losses to other entities with positive tax liabilities, amounting
to a major recapitalization of the corporate capital base. See COLT, supra note 63, at 4.
81. For example, some types of transfers (such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children) link the amount of the transfer to the participant's other income. If villagers move
to take jobs elsewhere, their transfers are reduced. The negative effect of transfer income on
mobility is also exacerbated by the low cost of public goods in the villages that provide an
incentive for residents to remain in the villages. See HUSKEY, supra note 4, at 12. It has been
estimated that transfers in western Alaska have increased population by as much as three
times that which the area could otherwise support. See Knapp & Huskey, supra note 42. Yet
from a Native perspective, the growth of the villages may be vital to the preservation of
Alaska Native culture; see ALASKA NATIVES COMMN, supra note 3, Vol. I.
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ever on state and federal income transfers.8 2

For scores of small and remote Village Alaska communities, almost
any economic activity other than subsistence can be done less expensively

elsewhere. Goods and services can be imported more cheaply than they can
be produced locally. ANCSA's objective that corporations would be formed,
capital accumulated, and profits made, has proven untenable for most
villages. In many cases, corporate spending has resulted without concomi-

tant sustainable economic development.
Moreover, subsistence -the principal foundation of the economy
and a core part of cultures in much of Village Alaska -is compromised by
the ANCSA corporate development and social transformation model. The
separation of land resource control from village government produces
resource utilization decisions that are not necessarily representative of

village interests. Subsistence resources-fish and wildlife and their essential
habitats -often suffer most. Their economic and cultural value to a village
can be much greater than their market value to the land-owning ANCSA
corporation. When corporations capitalize and exploit other resources, the
integrity or quality of subsistence resources is sometimes threatened.
This could be expected because corporations operate under
different rules than governments and cannot be their equivalents. Without
governmental control over their land and subsistence resources, Alaska
Native tribal members cannot determine for themselves the course of their
economic and cultural lives.
It is now clear that in designing ANCSA and its corporate business
structures more consideration should have been given to the natural
resource base, rural business opportunities and the market for commodities
produced, traditional values and practices countering policy objectives, and
similar issues. If, culturally, Natives use low-risk strategies as a modus
operandi, why superimpose high-risk strategies on them as evident in the
for-profit business ventures ANCSA promoted? As Chambers notess "It
is safer and more humane to proceed by short steps into what can be
foreseen than by long leaps into the unknown."
In many ways, ANCSA can be viewed as regressive for Alaska
Native political development. It institutionalized and reinforced divisions
between regions and villages, jeopardized Native lands by exposing them

82. The transfer economy also increases dependency on decision-making bodies outside
the villages that are responsible for state and federal laws, regulations, and programs
directly affecting village welfare. See Husm, supra note 4, at 12.
83. CRAMBERS, supra note 12, at 145.
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to alienation, corporate failure, and taxation, and did not recognize Native
or tribal government institutions."
The public sector has provided the policy basis and the economic
transfers to attempt to integrate precapitalist (subsistence) modes within a
larger political economy in rural Village Alaska. However, ANCSA policy,
with its key implementation mechanism of Native corporations, has not
succeeded in fostering widespread private sector village development to
replace public transfers.
Village Alaska's economy is unlikely to provide a stable and
healthy foundation for many of rural Alaska's communities, since it remains
dependent on currently declining public sector transfers and has restricted
access to resources. These village populations, maintained in economically
nonviable areas, inevitably constitute persistent rural poverty. However,
moves to increase Alaska Natives' sovereignty over resources (to modify or
replace ANCSA's corporate ownership structures) hold promise for
strengthening subsistence economies and helping to alleviate village
poverty.

84. See Morehouse, supranote 30, at 21. "We don't want to become better white men or
beat them at their own game. We just want a chance to develop our traditional values into
a satisfying way of life that we can understand. AN ACT is forcing us into new ways of
organizing ourselves ....AN ACT could split the Native peoples even more, set region
against region, village against village .... AN ACT is based on competition; the Native way
is based on cooperation." BIGJIM & ITO-ADLER, supranote 20, at 82-83.

